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This mini dissertation analyses the claims that Uganda is the success story of the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. Uganda was the first country to qualify for 
debt relief under this debt management programme, and has a reputation for being able to 
address its economic and social problems simultaneously. Furthermore, the manner in 
which Uganda has engaged with civil society has also received praise. Thus, some 
scholars believe that the country offers a model example for indicating the effectiveness 
of debt management programmes in general, and the HIPC Initiative in particular. 
However, other scholars are more critical, claiming that the successes that Uganda has 
experienced under the HIPC Initiative have been short lived, and have also compounded 
the country‘s indebtedness. There is therefore a robust debate in the literature regarding 
this topic as some scholars take a more optimistic view of the impact of the HIPC 
Initiative in Uganda, and other scholars take a more pessimistic stance. This mini 
dissertation surveys these contrasting views in the literature, and argues that because the 
HIPC Initiative failed to deliver the promises that it made Uganda was unable to sustain 
its achievements under the programme. The dissertation concludes that Uganda is not an 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The external debt in Uganda has plagued its development for the past four decades. There 
have been numerous initiatives implemented to understand and manage Uganda‘s debt 
crisis. Furthermore, there are mixed signs regarding the probability of Uganda 
overcoming its debt. On the one hand, some may argue that the external debt problem in 
countries such as Uganda is a hopeless issue, whereas on the other hand, others may 
argue that there are a variety of solutions that need to be explored. Nonetheless, there has 
been robust debate around debt in poor developing countries. This mini dissertation 
discusses Uganda‘s debt and debt management in relation to the group of developing 
countries, known as the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs). The HIPCs comprise 
low-income countries identified by the G7 and multilateral financial institutions (MFIs), 
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, that are the least likely 
to meet their debt obligations. Uganda is one of the countries that have been identified as 
heavily indebted.  
 
More specifically, Uganda provides an intriguing case study since it was the first to 
qualify for debt relief under both the initial HIPC Initiative of 1996 and the Enhanced 
HIPC Initiative of 1998, and so it is a country that is often cited as an HIPC success story. 
Despite the superior reputation Uganda has amongst the HIPCs, there remains a debate 
about whether Uganda has successfully maintained debt sustainability and managed to 
redirect its spending towards social welfare efficiently after attaining debt relief. This 















other words, it assesses the arguments that have been put forward regarding the successes 
and the failures of the HIPC Initiative and that determine whether or not Uganda is truly 
an HIPC Initiative success story. Therefore, the research question underpinning this thesis 
is whether the HIPC Initiative has, in fact, been effective in helping Uganda combat its 
debt problem, and whether the country is truly an HIPC Initiative success story as its 
supporters claim.  
 
As a starting point, it is essential to elaborate on the general nature and extent of the debt 
crisis in Uganda, and the need to combat it. Cohen (2005: 181) defines a national debt 
crisis as ―when a country lacks sufficient foreign exchange to make the principal and/or 
interest payment on its debt obligations‖. The economic data of the CIA‘s World Fact 
Book indicates that the country‘s external debt (as at 2009) is estimated at US$ 
2.554 billion while Uganda‘s gross domestic product (GDP) is estimated at US$ 17.12 
billion (CIA. The World Fact Book). According to a study, by Mijumbi (2001), on 
Uganda‘s debt prior to the HIPC Initiative, the country‘s external debt burden rose from 
US$ 172 million in 1970 to US$ 3.6 billion in 1996-1997, and debt as a percentage of 
GDP increased from 11.8 per cent in 1971 to 66.1 per cent in 1995. In 1997 Uganda was 
spending US$ 3 per person on health compared to US$ 9 per person on debt servicing 
annually. Debt servicing as a percentage of exports increased from 4 per cent in 1980 to 
23 per cent in 1996 and this number excludes the debt that had not been serviced at this 
time (Mijumbi, 2001: 497). These figures have placed pressure on the Ugandan 















actively and control or eliminate the damaging effects the crisis has on the nation‘s 
economy and social welfare. 
An important distinction is the difference between indebted developing countries on the 
one hand, and the 41 heavily indebted poor countries, including Uganda, which were 
identified by the G7 and Bretton Woods Institutions (the IMF and World Bank) in 1996, 
as needing specialised debt management on the other. Unlike many resilient developing 
countries, the HIPCs represent the world‘s poorest developing countries and the least 
likely group of countries to recover from debt. Therefore, the HIPCs can be differentiated 
from other developing countries in important ways. Firstly, although all developing 
countries exhibited symptoms of increasing and potentially unmanageable debt in the 
1980s, the heavily indebted countries‘ symptoms were more extreme than the other 
developing countries. Necessarily, the HIPCs‘ debt export, debt-Gross National Product 
(GNP) and debt-service ratios were notably higher than in other developing countries 
(Birdsall and Williamson, 2002: 20). 
Secondly, the HIPCs‘ economies are underdeveloped and their populations are generally 
poor. In fact, the poverty in the HIPCs has been getting worse rather than better, unlike 
most other developing nations (Birdsall and Williamson, 2002: 20-21). This can be 
reflected by the fact that 33 of the 41 HIPCs are in sub-Saharan Africa. Studies by 
organisations such as the UNDP have shown that sub-Saharan Africa in particular has 
increasing poverty rates. Despite the fact that poverty rates in 2004 were reported to have 
declined among the developing world, there were still around 299 million people in sub-















Furthermore, the rise in the number of poor was mainly because of continuing high 
population growth rates. However, it was also due to civil unrest and a succession of 
natural disasters, which pushed large numbers below the international poverty line 
(Nwachukwu, 2008: 4-5). Moreover, according to the 2005 United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), sub-Saharan Africa was the only region in the world where the 
overall human development index (HDI) had been declining since the 1990s (UNDP, 
2005). 
 
A third common characteristic of the HIPCs is that these nations are high recipients of 
Official Development Assistance (ODA). On average, net transfers (which are all loans 
and grants minus debt service paid) to the HIPCs were approximately 10 per cent of their 
GDP in the 1990s, representing as much as 60 per cent of their government revenue in 
some extreme cases, and financing most public investment (Birdsall and Williamson, 
2002: 20). In contrast, the average for all other developing countries in the past two 
decades was approximately 2 per cent of GDP. This suggests that the high levels of 
development assistance and the stagnation in exports and government revenue (as a result 
of low growth) combined to produce an increasingly unmanageable debt (Birdsall and 
Williamson, 2002: 21). 
 
The excessive debt levels and their consequences have negatively impacted the HIPCs in 
ways that are relatively more extreme than most developing countries in the world. Thus, 
it is important that the analysis of debt and its management be sensitive to these 















step in contextualising the debt crisis in Uganda and this is covered in the next chapter. 
Chapter 3 provides a brief account of Uganda‘s debt management history and also 
assesses the HIPC Initiative in particular. This is followed by Chapter 4, which covers the 
contentious debate around the success of the HIPC Initiative in Uganda. Lastly, this mini 
thesis concludes with its own view on Uganda‘s performance in the HIPC Initiative and 




















Chapter 2: The Causes and Effects of the Debt Crisis in 
Uganda 
 
In order to address and solve the debt problem, this mini-dissertation attempts to identify 
and categorise the key causes of debt in Uganda as a way of understanding the nature of 
Uganda‘s debt accumulation. The purpose of this chapter is also to draw attention to 
some of the political and economic legacies that Uganda has inherited, which continue to 
impact on the country‘s ability to manage its debt, even decades after the country 
declared its debt crisis.  
 
2.1 The Causes of Debt 
A distinction is often drawn between external and internal factors which led to a country‘s 
debt crisis. Moreover, although some scholars prefer to emphasise the role of one set of 
factors over the other causing the debt problem, it can also be argued that both internal 
and external factors led to the accumulation of external debt in the HIPCs. Particularly, in 
the literature on the Ugandan debt crisis, there are some scholars, such as Marianne 
Lindner (2003), who argue that many of Uganda‘s economic and political problems 
which caused the country‘s debt crisis can be attributed to political factors, and especially 
issues that arose under the Idi Amin regime, which began in 1971. Lindner‘s (2003) 
account of the emergence of Uganda‘s debt crisis does not take account of any of the 
vivid problems that surfaced in the beginning years of the country‘s independence under 
President Milton Obote‘s first regime (Obote 1). These include, the Ugandan Crisis of 















occurred in the country, or the blatant corruption and promotion of General Idi Amin 
under the Obote 1 regime.  
 
Other scholars, like Barbra Mbira and Michael Atingi (1997), do not mention of the 
impact of the controversial politics behind the accumulation of Uganda‘s debt. Rather 
they highlight the internal and external economic factors in their analysis. Mbira and 
Atingi (1997) summarise the most important causes of the debt crisis as the 1970s oil 
crises, deterioration in terms of trade and the decline in export earnings in the 1980s 
especially due to the fall in coffee prices, a build up of late payments and, lastly, and the 
highly expansionary fiscal deficit (Mbira and Atingi, 1997: 19). 
 
However, this study takes the view that the debt problem of poor countries, such as 
Uganda, is complex and driven by multidimensional forces. The external factors that are 
generally listed as prime causes of the debt crisis in most poor countries include: the 
economic impact of the 1970s oil crises; the irresponsible lending activities of donors; the 
lending by the USA and the USSR during the Cold War; the persisting colonial socio-
economic and political legacies in the HIPCs; and their marginalisation in the 
international political economy (Mijumbi, 2001: 497). The most popular internal factors 
mentioned as causes of the debt crisis are: incorrect economic policy decisions; 
mismanagement of the HIPCs' finances; corruption in the HIPCs; the militarisation of the 
HIPCs; and the capital and knowledge flight in the HIPCs (Mijumbi, 2001: 497). This 

















Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa (1999 and 2001) capture the various internal and external 
elements that shaped the context under which Uganda‘s debt arose. Furthermore, they 
trace some of the fundamental problems that led to the country‘s debt crisis in the 1960s, 
before the Amin regime and before the global economic crisis of the 1970s. This contrasts 
with other literature on the topic, like Lindner (2003), as some authors tend to give the 
impression that the 1960s was an era of optimism for Uganda in light of the country‘s 
political independence and expanding economy. Thus, they provide more and important 
information and analysis that is essential in contextualising the debt issues that some 
authors lack. This chapter details the specific and most important causes that can explain 
the nature of the debt problem in Uganda as explained by several authors. This thesis 
argues that there are numerous internal, external, political and economic factors that 
contributed to the Ugandas debt crisis, and the effects of the debt.  
 
As debt is a problem of post-independent Uganda, this thesis begins its analysis of the 
causes of the country‘s debt from Uganda‘s independence by providing a context. Uganda 
gained independence from Britain in 1962, which led to Milton Obote being elected the 
Prime Minister of Uganda (1962) and subsequently becoming the president of the country 
in 1966. The literature on the post-independence Ugandan economy of the 1960s 
generally describes the country as having an expanding economy and optimistic 
economic outlook. According to Marianne Lindner (2003: 1), Uganda was among the 
strongest sub-Saharan economies at independence from England in 1962 and was 















Furthermore, Uganda's economy was enjoying positive and high growth levels in 
domestic investment, private consumption, and domestic savings rates, which was 
essential for their government funding (Lindner, 2003: 1). In addition, Uganda had a 
favourable balance of payments level, its fiscal discipline was effectve and its external 
debt was relatively small and manageable (Lindner, 2003: 1).  
 
Moreover, Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa (1999: 7) point out that it was hoped that 
independence would redress the colonial legacies of the country which had reinforced the 
economic disparities within Uganda‘s public and private sectors. Bigsten and Kayizzi-
Mugerwa (2001) also describe the 1960s as the decade of ―the pressures of nationhood‖, 
in which Uganda‘s post-independence policy making was preoccupied with expanding 
investment; increasing economic growth; incorporating peasants and the rural sector in 
the development process; redressing the income inequalities and access to opportunities; 
overcoming the regional economic disparities; and preserving political power.  
 
The Ugandan leadership chose to achieve these aims through implementing leftist 
policies which entailed the nationalisation of all sectors and maintaining control of all 
areas of the economy. For instance, in order to eliminate agricultural marketing and 
private sector activities in the agricultural sector, a produce marketing board was 
established in 1968, with the mandate to market over 30 commodities (Mwaba, 2001: 5). 
Furthermore, in 1969 the government gave cooperative unions a monopoly of collecting 
and developing coffee, cotton and tobacco. Moreover, in the financial sector, the Banking 















national banks (Mwaba, 2001: 5). Lastly, in order to give the government overriding 
influence on monetary and fiscal policy, a Central Bank was established to replace the 
East African Currency Board (Mwaba, 2001: 5).  The government tightening its grip on 
the economy and finance, as seen in the examples above, can be viewed as an internal 
reason for the rise of debt in the country. 
 
Despite the vibrant economy and the government‘s efforts to create important policies 
that would make tangible differences to Uganda and its people, there were signs of 
internal problems and emerging tension. The causes of the tension that led to instability 
have been ascribed by some to ethnic and religious divisions in the Ugandan society, and 
by others to the socially divisive policies pursued by the British during the colonial 
period (EIU, 1998/1999: 4). Both explanations contain some truth. Uganda has 28 ethnic 
groups, the major ethnic division being between the Nilotic peoples of the north (such as 
the Acholi and the Langi tribes) and the Bantu of the south (including the Baganda tribe). 
According to the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU, 1998/1999: 4), the British pursued a 
policy of recruiting security forces, mainly from the northern ethnic groups, in this way 
initiating a military dominance of the south by the north. This dominance continued into 
the post-colonial period until the emergence of the predominantly Bantu-based National 
Resistance Army (NRA), led by Yoweri Museveni, who seized power in 1986.  
 
Moreover, British efforts to prevent the country from splitting into similar units after 
independence led to the imposition of a complex federal constitution (EIU, 1998/1999: 















and northern political parties which secured the election of the traditional Kabaka (king) 
of Buganda (a Bantu from the south) as president and of Milton Obote (a Langi from the 
north) as prime minister (EIU, 1998/1999: 5). 
 
Nonetheless, shortly after independence there was tension in the military for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, there was a collapse of the political alliance between the radical and 
conservative streams of Uganda‘s political elite. Secondly, there was rising disaffection, 
both within and outside the party, with the ruling party and increasingly powerful and 
monolithic Uganda People‘s Congress (UPC), led by Milton Obote (Glentworth and 
Hancock, 1973: 239-240). The Ugandan crisis, which involved a power struggle between 
the Obote government and his former ally Kabaka leader of Buganda, was proof of this 
increasing tension and divisions within the political leadership. This tension led to a 
bloody military confrontation by the government with the relatively defenceless Buganda 
region and palace in 1966. It can be argued that the Ugandan crisis demonstrated how the 
military in the country was becoming an increasingly powerful tool for government in 
preserving power and using coercion, which was similar to the previous colonial order 
(Glentworth and Hancock, 1973: 240). In addition, military spending became a highly 
prioritised expense for the government.  
 
Militarisation is a common element mentioned by authors regarding the causes of debt in 
the HIPCs. Author Meghad Desai (2002) explains that for these countries their 
independence struggles were based on ―the naïve premise that the nation state is actually 















banishing colonisers who were exploiting and taking the wealth of the indigenous 
inhabitants‖ (Desai, 2002: 12). In this way, the liberation leaders promised to reclaim the 
control and benefits of the indigenous people's resources and invest them for the poor 
(Desai, 2002: 12). However, the post-liberation industrialisation process proved to be 
explosive. Furthermore, conflicts which resulted from issues around arbitrary colonial 
frontiers and undeclared territorial claims became strong motivation for many 
governments to increase the strength of the army and military equipment (Desai, 2002: 
12).  
 
Moreover, in most cases the military equipment was often manufactured in the industrial 
countries and then imported. Thus, substantial amounts of the HIPCs' small foreign 
exchange budget were allocated to military expenditure. Consequently, once their foreign 
exchange reserves were depleted suppliers often granted them substantial military aid 
loans. On numerous occasions, governments of developing countries did not stop buying 
arms, even when foreign exchange earnings and foreign exchange reserves had declined. 
The debt crisis became acute and recourse to the IMF was inevitable. It has been 
estimated that arms imports and militarisation account for a fifth of total foreign debt. In 
fact, Uganda‘s military expenditure by 1980 was 20.6 per cent over budget (Korner, 
Maass, Siebold and Tetzlaff, 1986: 38-39). 
 
In addition to this, another internal cause of the debt crisis in Uganda was the anti-Asian 
sentiment that developed in the politics of the country. The anti-Asian sentiment in 















1970s, and proved to have detrimental economic effects. Asians in Uganda dominated the 
wholesale and commercial trade industry, which were two important and thriving areas of 
the economy. Asian-generated wealth for the country and Asian business activities 
became the fibre of the economy, providing Uganda with entrepreneurs, artisans and 
financiers. However, the impact of anti-Asian sentiment, which accused Ugandan Asians 
of ―milking the economy of its wealth‖ led to their expulsion in 1972 (Lindner, 2003: 2). 
As a result of the expulsion, the government confiscated business and property from 
Asians and mandated untrained people from the military to manage these businesses, 
which was an unprofitable decision. This led to corruption, mismanagement, inefficiency, 
economic uncertainty, and a decline in output and revenues in the 1970s, which in turn 
caused the government to seek more loans from banks (Mwaba, 2001: 6). 
 
All these trends of internal weaknesses in the leadership and decision making of the 
1960s were examples of the concentration of power in the government. According to 
Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa (1999: 17), the developments of the 1970s were more the 
consequences of this concentration of power than the weakening of the institutions of the 
1960s. Thus, some of the major fundamental internal causes of debt in Uganda that 
emerged in the 1960s, despite the period being viewed as optimistic by many, included 
corruption, economic mismanagement and military expenditure. 
 
Furthermore, in the early 1970s Uganda also ushered in a new leader as the infamous 
General Idi Amin became Uganda‘s president. On the one hand, Bigsten and Kayizzi-















in the 1960s while highlighting the fundamental issues that were emerging in this decade 
and contribute to the analysis of the causes of Uganda‘s debt. On the other hand, Lindner 
(2003) provides an optimistic account of Uganda‘s political economy of the 1960s, by 
focusing on how the Ugandan economy expanded and the new regime was determined to 
redress the country‘s colonial legacy, and provides a blatantly negative account of 
Uganda as of 1971, associating many of Uganda‘s problems with Amin‘s coming into 
power. Another distinction betweeen Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa (1999) and Lindner 
(2003) is that Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa (1999: 20) acknowledge that the rise of 
Amin was not a sudden occurrence but rather the result of his increasing popularity 
among key groups in Uganda during the first Obote regime, especially within the 
southern region of Uganda, the bureaucrats, businessmen, Bugandan royalty and Western 
diplomats who had all been experiencing declining power and privilege during the Obote 
I regime. His regime was initially expected to put an end to human rights violations and 
economic inefficiencies that had been highly controversial issues under the Obote I rule 
(Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1999: 20). However, when assessing the entire period of 
his rule from 1971 to 1979, it is clear that Amin began to loose support and that his 
approach to ruling Uganda was much more repressive and misguided than Obote I. 
 
Interestingly, General Idi Amin and his allies accused Obote of corruption and tribalism 
and instigated a coup in 1971, which resulted in Amin becoming president. However, 
instead of addressing tribal tensions Amin continued to reinforce them as a strategy to 
keep himself in power, and even surrounded himself with a small military elite who were 















regime Amin initiated violent attacks on the Langi (Obote‘s tribe) and their Acholi 
neighbours, and random murders of well-known people lost him support in the Bantu 
south. An estimated 300 000 people were killed in a succession of purges lasting seven 
years (EIU, 1998/1999: 5). In addition, the positive GDP growth plummeted persistently 
and reached negative digits at –3 per cent per annum for the period 1971 to 1979 due to 
the civil war, and the economy was on the verge of collapse towards the end of the 1970s 
(Easterley et al., 1993: 473).  
 
Furthermore, economic mismanagement and decision making under Amin led to more 
indebtedness. General Amin undertook a number of economic policies which were aimed 
at stabilising the economy, but in actual fact owing to their general lack of focus they 
proved to be further detrimental. These policies included: the Commercial Transactions 
Levy of 1972, which aimed to expand the tax base but failed because of the poor tax 
culture in Uganda and weak administrative capacity; the Land Reform Decree of 1975, 
which was socioeconomic legislation which failed to generate the economic resources 
necessary to finance the civil service and the army and to maintain political support. The 
Action Plan of 1977, which was the final and expensive attempt by the government to 
stabilise the economy. It  targeted investment and domestic savings. However, this plan 
proved to be unrealistic especially because of its reliance on foreign exchange availability 
and export earnings, which were both unfavourable during this time (Bigsten and 















The misguidance and failure of these plans proved costly as the money that was spent on 
implementing them was lost, and the money that was expected they would generate never 
materialised. Thus, more debt was accumulated to compensate for these losses in 
government spending. 
 
Political instability and brutal repression plagued Uganda within and even outside its 
borders throughout the Amin regime. The 1970s ended with a war against Tanzania, and 
the ousting of Amin in 1979. For the whole of its existence, Amin‘s regime had had poor 
relations with Tanzania, where Obote and the bulk of Uganda‘s political elite were in 
exile after Amin assumed power in 1971 (EIU, 1998/1999: 5). Even subsequent to 
Amin‘s regime, Uganda has executed military interventions in Congo and sent combat 
soldiers to Angola, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Rwanda, Zimbabwe and 
others (Reno, 2002: 416). Nonetheless, Amin‘s fall in 1979 occurred because of the 
conflict with Tanzania at the time. This was also influenced by ex-President Obote, who 
refused to recognise the new regime in Kampala. The Tanzanian forces, with the 
additional support of an army of Ugandan expatriates, invaded Uganda following a 
territorial dispute, and General Amin fled abroad (EIU, 1998/1999: 5). 
 
After the Amin regime, there were three governments in less than two years. The Lule 
government was in office for only 70 days (April to June 1979); followed by Binaisa who 
ruled for close to a year; and the Military Commission, which ushered in the elections of 
1980 (Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1999: 32). However, since there was a leadership 















insecurity in the country and also led to the deterioration of economic reform by the 
subsequent regimes. Furthermore, the civil war and the failure to contain corruption 
resulted in political and economic chaos, while power continued to be seen as a means to 
private enrichment (Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1999: 32). Thus, the legacy of the 
poor governance continued to haunt the country. 
 
The relevance of discussing how internal factors caused and compounded the debt in 
Uganda is that it acknowledges that Uganda‘s own leadership played an integral part in 
attaining the country‘s enormous levels of debt. Many of the HIPCs have fallen into 
similar circumstances and currently struggle to overcome these leadership legacies. The 
failure of development projects, overly ambitious economic policy decisions, corruption, 
militarisation, dictatorship, and diminishing opportunities for investment are all common 
causes of debt that HIPCs have experienced and Uganda is a classic example of this.  
 
Nonetheless, Uganda‘s economy and debt accumulation were also significantly impacted 
by events within the international political economy that were out of the Ugandan 
leadership‘s control. Many developing countries, including Uganda and the HIPCs, were 
sognificantly affected by the oil crisis and the world economic recession during the 
1970s. The 1970s oil crises brought about a dramatic shrinkage of oil supplied globally, 
and had disastrous consequences such as a rise in oil prices, a slowdown in trade between 
countries, a decrease in the price of basic commodities, world wide recession, rising 
interest rates and an expensive battle for countries to find oil substitutes (Balch, 2001: 6). 















to US$ 732.7 million by 1980. In addition, considering these economic hurdles 
experienced in this decade, more debt was acquired in order to meet debt obligations and 
restore the economy. Thus, the economic climate during the 1970s worsened the payment 
position and economic resilience of Uganda as well as countries around the world 
(Mijumbi, 2001: 497). The country‘s real value of exports declined from 19 per cent of 
GDP in 1970 to 2 per cent in 1980, which flowed from a decline in the production of 
export crops (with a narrowing of the export base to coffee only), and falling world 
coffee prices. Moreover, the country‘s public deficit worsened, and as the government 
borrowed from the banking system inflation became rampant. In addition to this, 
government expenditure contracted as a proportion of GDP (Lindner, 2003: 2).  
 
The heavy lending of funds to Uganda has also been identified as an external factor that 
led to high indebtedness (Mijumbi, 2001: 497). Rich countries, especially the United 
States of America and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and banks have been 
accused of reckless and manipulative lending practices towards the HIPCs. For example, 
the Soviet Union and the West continued lending to countries in Africa which had been in 
civil war for more than a decade, including Uganda, Angola and Mozambique during the 
Cold War (Balch, 2001: 25). Thus, there was a clear political agenda attached to the loans 
provided by the USA and USSR during the Cold War, in which the US and USSR loaned 
money to HIPCs and dubious leaders, such as Idi Amin, in order to win the support of the 
















The commercial banks were often accused of ―loan pushing‖ in the years leading to the 
1980s debt crisis, which encouraged debtor countries to increase their liabilities (Cohen, 
2005: 184). Some believe that the banks engaged in loan pushing, with little regard to the 
creditworthiness of countries, because they sought to increase their loan activity in the 
South. As a result these large commercial banks charged extremely low interest rates, 
which did not give least developed countries (LDCs) adequate signals as to when to stop 
borrowing (Cohen, 2005: 184). This was also a way in which Uganda might have 
increased its national debt. 
 
Also, writers such as Korner, Maass, Siebold and Tetzlaff (1986: 26) believe the colonial 
legacy in HIPCs is revealed by certain aspects of their economic, social and political 
structures which contain the germs of ‗indebted‘ development. Furthermore, Akokpari 
(2001: 155-156) argues that in many poor countries the convergence of debt, inflation 
and a narrow export base concentrated in primary commodities has sunk the 
competitiveness of the group‘s economies, and reduced these countries‘ ability to be 
conspicuous members of the ―global village‖. Hence, on the one hand, poor countries 
became heavily dependent on international financial institutions and the global economy 
through aid and structural adjustment programmes. On the other hand, these countries 
became marginalised in the global economy as illustrated by the decline of development 
aid and foreign investment, especially since the lowering of the strategic significance of 
these nations after the Cold War (Akokpari, 2001: 155). Furthermore, the deteriorating 
terms of trade that Uganda has experienced has also put a strain on its ability to grow out 















does not offer sufficient support structures for poor countries to end their economic 
dependence on rich countries or institutions which are influenced by the developed 
world. Therefore, this argument suggests that Uganda and countries listed as HIPCs are 
unable to explore and develop their economic, political and social structures fully on their 
own terms, and are permanently locked into indebtedness and underdevelopment. 
 
However, in as much as this thesis may examine economic and political elements behind 
the debt crisis, Uganda also needed to recover from its social crisis. The reality the 
Ugandan people lived was that their taxes were misspent, their country‘s infrastructure 
had been destroyed, their lives and communities were in danger, and their country 
leadership was fundamentally flawed and had managed to convert one of the African 
continent‘s most promising nations into a heavily indebted and poor country. 
Furthermore, the Ugandan people were the most important stakeholders of the economy 
and in terms of the mounting debt the country was accumulating and there were a number 
of agents responsible for the situation the country found itself in. 
 
2.2 The Effects of Debt 
Some of the effects of high indebtedness in poor countries include: lack of investment 
flows; the debt overhang, which is the negative impact of a large external debt burden on 
economic growth and investment (UNCTAD, 2004a: 9); the contraction in access to 
international financial markets (Classens et al, 1997: 36); and the ―debt boomerang‖, 
which is a concept coined by Susan George (1992: 20) and which explains how a number 
of effects of an unresolved debt crisis in the third world, such as immigration issues and 















Uganda‘s economy uses more resources to pay its debt, the opportunity cost of this is that 
fewer resources are available for the country to generate a variety of opportunities for 
Ugandans. Thus, Ugandans may want to explore the resources that other richer 
developing countries and developed countries have and immigrate to these countries, 
either legally or illegally. Another example of the debt boomerang could be that the 
political instability and civil wars that emerge in Uganda mean that government is 
spending money on militarisation instead of its debt obligations and so the country sinks 
into more debt. Simultaneously, the country will also require the government to request 
the assistance of the developed countries to prevent this instability or bring it to an end or 
assist with Uganda‘s recovery, as insecurity in Uganda is a threat to global insecurity. 
These examples indicate that the developed world is also impacted by Uganda‘s (and 
other poor countries‘) debt. 
 
Given these and many other effects of debt, it can be argued that debt in Uganda needs to 
be addressed from a number of different strategies and through a variety of stakeholders. 
The debt overhang, lack of investment and exclusion from financial markets that the 
HIPCs experience imply that their debt hampers them from improving their economies 
and providing more resources for their citizens. Therefore, debt management needs to 
address and facilitate the HIPCs successful integration into the global economic and 
financial system. Furthermore, the debt boomerang indicates that debt in the HIPCs, 
particularly in an era of increasing globalisation, needs to be viewed as a global issue 
because of the spillover effects that emerge and impact influential nations and 















from the international community as this community can also be argued to be 
stakeholders of the debt in HIPCs. International institutions, particularly the World Bank 
and IMF, have arguably been significantly involved in Uganda‘s economic decision 
making and reform and in providing debt relief.  
 
The next chapter of this thesis discusses the reforms that have been made since the 1980s 
by the government of Uganda to manage the national debt. Particularly Uganda‘s 

















Chapter 3: Uganda’s Debt Management and the HIPC 
Initiative 
 
External debt has been Uganda‘s concern for decades. Despite Amin‘s absence since 
early 1979, coordinated economic reforms were not embarked upon until 1981, when a 
military-civilian coalition, Obote II, began to receive technical and financial assistance 
from the IMF and the World Bank. These MFIs have been major actors in Uganda‘s 
economic adjustment efforts since then. The aim of this chapter is to discuss the 
numerous attempts that the Ugandan government has made to save the economy from the 
debt crisis, and to explain the role of international financial institutions, such as the IMF 
and World Bank, in facilitating the policy changes that Uganda has made to address the 
economic situation.  
 
Thus, the intention of this chapter is to reveal reasons for the lack of success of Uganda‘s 
previous debt management policies and to discuss why the HIPC Initiative and the 
country‘s perceived success with the Initiative are so relevant. Furthermore, in the 
literature that praises Uganda‘s performance under the HIPC Initiative, there is often 
mention of the country‘s history of following the economic reform policies prescribed by 
the international financial institutions, and how this can explain the nation‘s debt 
management success relative to the other HIPCs. This chapter also argues that, although 
Uganda has demonstrated a greater commitment to economic reform than most of the 
HIPCs, the consequences of this are that the country has become more dependent on 
international assistance. Thus, although Uganda has been cooperative with the 















result of its cooperation, these benefits have had limited utility because they require 
stringent economic reforms in a country with few resources and capacities. And so the 
country continues to grapple with debt; it remains dependent on international assistance 
and cannot explore its own alternatives as the country‘s leadership has little autonomy 
over its economic policy. Therefore, the question remains: is giving in to the demands of 
the IMF and World Bank, which include having to face these unfavourable consequences, 
the price that must be paid in order to be an HIPC success story? 
 
Undeniably, the IMF and World Bank assistance, together with aid from other Western 
donors, was crucial to the country‘s stabilisation, adjustment, and recovery during the 
reforms pursued in the 1980s and 1990s in Uganda. However, such assistance typically 
comes with associated conditions. When it came to loan conditionality, generally all of 
the donor institutions‘ conditions overlap (Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1999: 52). 
Nevertheless, in terms of distinguishing policy areas targeted by the institutions, the 
World Bank‘s programmes focused on two broad areas: public sector reform, including 
overhaul of public expenditures, tax reform, and reform of the civil service; and trade 
reform, including liberalisation of commodity marketing and reform of tariff barriers. In 
contrast, the IMF focused more on monetary and financial sector reforms, in addition to 
external indebtedness (Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1999: 52). 
 
Necessarily, Uganda‘s external debt owed to the IMF and World Bank was at low levels 
at the end of the 1970s (Lindner, 2003: 3). However, once the structural adjustment 















country received increased IMF and World Bank assistance through loans. This may 
seem counterproductive, but structural adjustments are a key reason for the debt problem 
in the HIPCs and the developing world at large. In fact, Mwenda (2006: 6) argues that 
over 90 per cent of Uganda‘s debt was incurred during the implementation of World 
Bank– and IMF-sponsored economic reform policies of stabilisation and structural 
adjustment, beginning in 1981. He claims that if those policies had worked as their 
advocates had argued, Uganda should have been able to pay its way out of debt 
(Mwenda, 2006: 6). Nonetheless, Uganda‘s adjustment experience is often divided into 
two distinct phases, as outlined below.  
 
3.1 Uganda’s Debt Management History 
The first period of structural adjustment was between 1981 and 1986 under Obote II. This 
began with a degree of optimism as the economy responded but which quickly gave way 
to policy regression as domestic civil strife overshadowed economic concerns and the 
country lost its World Bank support (Nannyonjo, 2001: 4). Furthermore, Lindner (2003: 
3) writes that during this first phase loans were made under two IMF standby 
arrangements, totalling about US$ 270 million and an International Development 
Assistance (IDA) credit of about US$ 105 million, which together marked the beginning 
of the increase in Uganda‘s external debt to unsustainable levels. Nonetheless, the 
reforms of this first period failed to revive the economy. Thus, the NRM (National 
Resistance Movement) Army led by Museveni managed to overthrow the government in 
















The second phase of the adjustments, called the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP), 
began in the period 1987 to 1992 and was the more successful phase of economic reform 
of the 1980s under the new Ugandan leadership of Museveni (Bigsten and Kayizzi-
Mugerwa, 1999: 32). The aims of the ERP were to bring about internal financial stability 
and lower inflation, and external stability by increasing exports and investment, 
rehabilitating assets and infrastructure and promoting long-term growth (Holmgren et al, 
1999: 19). Necessarily, key reforms were carried out during this period, which 
encouraged economic liberalisation, like abolishing price controls for coffee, and the 
government loosening its grip on the economy. The reforms were strongly supported by 
the IMF and World Bank, as well as with bilateral aid, and Uganda became heavily 
reliant on loans from international financial institutions. Furthermore, these loans and 
strict conditionalities contributed further to a worsened debt position; particularly, over 
the period 1987 to 1992 the World Bank loaned US$ 1 billion towards the ERP 
(Holmgren et al., 1999: 20).  
 
According to a study conducted by officials from the World Bank and the Bank of 
Uganda, there were a number of key results of the ERP between 1987 and 1991. These 
included a reduced rate of inflation from an average of 190 per cent to 28 per cent; a 
boost in GDP growth rate to an annual average of 6.3 per cent between 1988 and 1991; 
and a gradual improvement of exports and investment (in both the private and public 
sectors) (Holmgren et al., 1999: 20). Interestingly, by 1991 most properties had been 
returned to their former Asian owners, who started to come back to the country (Lindner, 















managing its economy, with the aim of reviving its former economic significance and 
prosperity. Furthermore, it was believed that, through implementing reforms to manage 
the economy with international assistance, the country could possibly grow its way out of 
the debt trap. However, the country and the international financial institutions soon 
realised that growing out of debt would be particularly difficult for Uganda. Furthermore, 
the distinction between economic recovery and social recovery became more apparent as 
Uganda continued to boast economic progress, while its population continued to be 
impoverished. 
 
Moreover, on the one hand Ugandan policy makers embarked on broad corrective 
measures supported by a variety of financial packages from the international community, 
while on the other hand the country‘s capacity to generate its own resources remained 
weak (Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1999: 51). Furthermore, Uganda‘s dependence on 
external aid and loans increased at the same time as the country was experiencing adverse 
terms-of-trade movements, and continued civil instability in some regions (Nannyongo, 
2001: 4). 
 
Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa (1999: 51) further note that economic reform was difficult 
to establish in the 1980s because, although the country had just emerged from economic 
and political chaos, Uganda in the late 1980s had serious problems of programme 
sequencing. The government was caught in a vicious circle. For example, while 
improving internal security was crucial for creating a peaceful environment for 















There was also the contradiction of the public sector, which was declared in all policy 
statements to be ill equipped, poorly run, and corrupt, and yet was expected to spearhead 
the adjustment effort. Thus, it is argued that an unreformed public sector would likely 
have hindered reforms in the rest of the economy (Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1999: 
51).  
 
It has also been claimed that many of the reforms further presupposed a functioning 
financial sector, and yet the country‘s financial institutions themselves, including the 
Bank of Uganda, were still weak, and rampant inflation hindered the pace of policy and 
institutional reform (Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1999: 51). Therefore, failure to 
resolve these dilemmas delayed many ambitious initiatives, such as civil service reform, 
eradication of corruption, and a new Investment Code which legalised foreign 
investment, and thus foreign ownership in the economy (Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 
1999: 54). Consequently, much of the ERP had been based on expected increased foreign 
investment which in fact did not materialise (Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1999: 51). 
 
Thus, in the 1990s the debt levels continued to increase. In fact, the proportion of 
concessional loans increased from under 20 per cent of bilateral and multilateral loans in 
1981 to almost 60 per cent in 1990 (GDF 2001; Lindner, 2003: 4). In addition, 
concessionality of multilateral loans was far higher than that of bilateral loans. Also, most 
foreign aid received in the 1980s was in the form of loans as opposed to grants, but this 
proportion declined from about 70 to 80 per cent in the first half of the 1980s to 60 per 















many loans were not. As a result, debt accumulated and debt service payments became a 
burden to the economy, especially from the 1980s and well into the 1990s (Lindner, 
2003: 4).  
 
Muwanga-Zake and Ndhaye (2001: 5) argue that an important aspect to note about the 
structural adjustments is that they did not purely focus on the external debt management 
in Uganda and, thus, the Ugandan government only really started to target its external 
debt problem from 1991. The authors explain that the 1991 Debt Strategy and the 1995 
Enhanced Debt Strategy, which aimed to reduce national debt. This entailed the 
following considerable accomplishments that were critical for the economic foundation 
for the rest of the decade: 
 Paris Club debt rescheduling and stock-reduction options; 
 A commercial debt buy-back; 
 Donor contribution to service multilateral debt; 
 Strict limits on new non-concessional borrowing; 
 Consistent implementation of economic recovery programme targets; 
 Major efforts to improve the management of debt, fiscal policy and reserves; and 
 The establishment of clear procedures for negotiating new loans and an 
emphasised commitment to reduce the stock of arrears significantly (Muwanga-
Zake and Ndhaye, 2001: 5).  
 
Furthermore, various debt-reduction operations involving the Paris Club, bilateral and 















However, despite the relief efforts outlined above, debt continued to rise in the 1990s, 
although at a slower rate than in the second half of the 1980s. By end June 1996 Uganda 
remained heavily indebted with a stock of external debt of US$ 3.5 billion or 63 per cent 
of GDP, and of which 75.5 per cent constituted multilateral debt (Muwanga-Zake and 
Ndhaye, 2001: 6). Regarding sustainability targets, Uganda‘s net present value (NPV) of 
debt (after implementing Paris Club rescheduling and stock reduction) was approximately 
US$ 1.7 billion, or 233 per cent of exports of goods and non-factor services. This is a 
clear indication that Uganda could not achieve debt sustainability within a reasonable 
period even with good performance (Muwanga-Zake and Ndhaye, 2001: 6). 
 
The high share of multilateral debt also represented a significant barrier by way of the 
debt relief options available to the government. Government, with the assistance of 
creditors, set up the Multilateral Debt Fund (MDF) in 1997 to receive contributions from 
donors to be applied to servicing multilateral debt. From its inception the fund attracted 
contributions to the tune of US$ 135 million (Muwanga-Zake and Ndhaye, 2001: 7). In a 
sense the MDF assisted in reducing Uganda‘s debt, especially since the HIPC Initiative 
was launched a year before. However, it simultaneously perpetuated the country‘s 
dependence on donor funds to solve its debt problem, and revive its economy. 
 
3.2 The Introduction of the HIPC Initiative in Uganda 
The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative was first launched in 1996 by the 
IMF and the World Bank. The aim of the HIPC Initiative was to ensure that no poor 
country faces a debt burden it cannot manage. Necessarily, the initiative entails 















organisations and governments, to reduce HIPC external debt to sustainable levels. 
Moreover, the initiative involves a commitment made at the decision point – after a three-
year track record by the international financial community – to provide sufficient debt 
relief to eligible countries (Boote, Kilby, Thugge and van Trotsenburg, 1997: 126). 
However, this deal is on condition that the country completes a further three-year period 
of strong policy performance (Boote, Kilby, Thugge and van Trotsenburg; 1997: 126). 
Many believe that the HIPC Initiative was unique compared to the traditional debt relief 
approaches. This is because it sought to reduce debt stock to sustainable levels, subject to 
satisfactory policy performance of beneficiaries. Furthermore, many thought the HIPC 
Initiative situated debt relief within a framework of social welfare development. Boote, 
Kilby, Thugge and van Trotsenburg (1997: 126) believed that the initiative would enable 
HIPCs to focus on the policies required to tackle impediments to sustainable growth. 
These policies would include addressing issues regarding the inadequate physical 
infrastructures, untrained workforces, and weak institutions (Boote, Kilby, Thugge and 
van Trotsenburg; 1997: 126). In addition, UNCTAD (2004b: 14) felt that the initiative 
was governed by the principle of ―equitable burden sharing‖. This meant that each 
multilateral creditor, donor agency and commercial creditor would provide debt relief 
proportional to the amount of a country‘s indebtedness to it.  
 
The African Development Bank (AfDB) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) explain the composition of Uganda‘s external debt IS as 















9 per cent was owed to non-Paris Club bilateral creditors, and 1 per cent to Paris Club 
creditors (AfDB/OECD, 2006: 512). Thus, it was believed that through the HIPC 
Initiative, the G7 would significantly improve Uganda‘s long-term debt sustainability 
and, even further, the Initiative was expected to lower the country‘s debt to export ratio to 
about 50 per cent in 2015 (AfDB/OECD, 2006: 512). 
 
Birdsall and Williamson (2002: 26) recall the enthusiasm and optimism about the new 
Initiative. In 1996 the IMF and the World Bank predicted that 20 of the 41 countries then 
eligible to participate in the Initiative would eventually reach their completion point, and 
that the HIPC Initiative would provide a total debt stock reduction of US$ 8.2 billion 
(about 20 per cent of their outstanding debt). However, after nearly three years in the 
process, only six countries - Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Cote d‘Ivoire, Guyana, Mozambique, 
and Uganda - had reached the decision point, and only Uganda had reached the 
completion point (Birdsall and Williamson, 2002: 26). These disappointing figures 
resulted in strong pressure from the public, including from non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and civil society at large, academics and some HIPC governments. 
These groups highlighted the inadequacies of the original Initiative. The public outcry 
culminated in the official creditors meeting in September 1999. This resulted in the 
creditors formally agreeing to an enhanced HIPC framework that provided more and 
















According to scholars Muwanga-Zake and Ndhaye (2001: 8):  
The government of Uganda thus embraced the HIPC initiative with much optimism and 
anticipation and committed itself to promoting rapid economic growth with equity. In 
recognition of the country‘s track record of a decade of adjustment, it lobbied hard to 
persuade the Bretton Wood Institutions and the G7 that it should receive both the 
decision and completion points early in 1997. However, several G7 governments opposed 
this idea and the completion point was fixed at April 1998. 
 
Somerville (2005: 218) explains that what especially distinguished the HIPC Initiative 
from other debt relief programmes was that throughout the construction and 
implementation of the Initiative the governments of the HIPCs took proactive measures 
to facilitate communication with donors, NGOs, and civil society. The measures 
included:  
 Establishing quarterly meetings with donors to discuss debt and macroeconomic 
issues;  
 Using Consultative Group meetings with the World Bank to present its views on 
enhancement;  
 Communicating its message and expressing gratefulness to NGOs and civil 
society; and  
 Constructively working with the Bretton Woods Institutions.  
 
Nonetheless, having established a satisfactory track record of adjustment and reform 
supported by the IMF and World Bank, Uganda became the first country to qualify for 















April 1997, and attained completion point in April 1998. At this stage, the country 
received US$ 700 million (in nominal terms) of debt relief (World Bank. Uganda: 
Country Brief). Under the terms of this original HIPC framework, Uganda ―was expected 
to save an average of approximately $37 million per year in debt service over the next 10 
years, an average of $22 million per year during 2010-2019, and an average of $3.5 
million per year during 2020-2038‖ (World Bank. Uganda: Country Brief). 
 
However, shortly after this success Uganda‘s debt became unsustainable once again, and 
this raised concern about the effectiveness of the HIPC Initiative and whether the 
initiative could live up to its expectations. Furthermore, the NPV of external debt at end 
June 1999 had risen to US$ 1,806 million against the projected US$ 1,608 million at the 
completion point of April 1998. The ratio of NPV of debt to exports increased to 248 per 
cent at end June 1999 compared with the projected 207 per cent. The share of multilateral 
debt for the same period had also increased to 81 per cent. In line with the revised 
sustainability indicators, the World Bank and IMF estimated additional relief necessary to 
bring Uganda‘s ratio of NPV of debt to export to 150 per cent to be about US$ 714 
million (Muwanga-Zake and Ndhaye, 2001: 9-10). Hence, owing to the short-lived 
success of the initial HIPC Initiative, there was a need for the enhanced version, which 
would provide deeper and faster relief.  
 
The enhancement of the HIPC included various new elements such as: 
 It reduced the time to the completion point to less than three years. The enhanced 















point with a floating completion point. Under pressure from NGOs such as the 
Jubilee debt forgiveness campaign and other debt relief movement, the process of 
reaching the decision point was accelerated such that by the end of 2000 some 22 
countries had reached the decision point. 
 It reduced eligibility standards to allow more countries to access debt relief. 
 It provided for greater relief between the decision and completion points, and 
 In an effort to make sure that resources arising from debt relief were used for the 
purpose of reducing poverty, the relief was tied to progress made in preparing 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) in their own country context. For a 
country to be eligible for the HIPC Initiative it must have a PRSP in place by the 
decision point and should have made substantial progress in its implementation by 
the completion point (Obwona and Ndhaye, 2010: 5). 
 
Having qualified for first HIPC, Uganda had little difficulty meeting the requirements for 
the enhanced HIPC. Unlike the initial HIPC Initiative, the enhanced version required the 
governments to provide PRSPs to the World Bank and IMF. The World Bank and IMF 
Board and the Ugandan Ministers met with the IMF and World Bank in early 1999, and 
endorsed the Bretton Woods institutions‘ recommendation to have a closer tie between 
debt relief and poverty reduction to make progress towards the international development 
target. Interestingly, the Ugandan government was the first to prepare and implement its 
development strategy in 1997, which was titled the Poverty Eradication Action Plan 
















This strategy was applied following the country‘s experience in implementing the 
Programme for the Alleviation of Poverty and the Social Cost of Adjustment (PAPSCA) 
project. The aim was to alleviate poverty among the vulnerable groups that were being 
negatively affected by the structural adjustment programmes (Muwanga-Zake and 
Ndhaye, 2001: 9-10). Therefore, this document together with the findings of the poverty 
assessment participatory survey formed the benchmarks for the country‘s PRSP. This was 
approved by the donor community involved in the HIPC Initiative (Muwanga-Zake and 
Ndhaye, 2001: 9-10). Over and above the poverty reduction frameworks, Uganda also 
established the Poverty Action Fund under the HIPC Initiative, which allowed gross 
savings from debt disbursement to be channelled into poverty-reduction strategies 
(Somerville, 2005: 221). 
 
Subsequently, after a series of discussions with the donor community and the other 
stakeholders, Uganda accessed the enhanced HIPC with effect from May 2000. Of the 
total debt-service relief under the HIPC of some US$ 2 billion, the World Bank provided 
nearly US$ 1 billion (US$ 517 million in NPV terms) (World Bank. Uganda: Country 
Brief). Some scholars recorded that in total, as a result of both initiatives, Uganda was 
granted debt relief amounting to US$ 1 billion in NPV terms to be delivered over a period 
of 20 years (Kuteesa and Nabbumba, 2004: 49). As a consequence, Uganda has received 
substantial cash savings, averaging US$ 60 million per annum over the past four years, 
accounting for almost a quarter of the total budget support over the period (Kuteesa and 















in debt relief, and is set to rise further in the medium term (Kuteesa and Nabbumba, 
2004: 49). 
 
Thus, it seems that Uganda managed to establish some important economic gains through 
both the HIPC initiatives. Furthermore, the country earned the reputation as the most 
willing and equipped HIPC to adapt to the IMF and World Bank policy prescriptions 
because of its economic reform history. However, it would be incorrect to assume that 
these gains did not come at a cost. Formulating policy to address poverty and appease the 
donor community is one thing; seeing positive results is another. Furthermore, what 
becomes increasingly apparent through Uganda‘s various attempts at reducing its debt 
over the years is the clearly limited policy autonomy that the country has when it comes 
to its external debt. Even though the HIPC Initiative appears more inclusive in its 
approach, in essence Uganda is still engaging with the Initiative on the terms of these 
multilateral organisations, and the fact that Uganda continues to engage on these terms 
implies that the country still has a high level of dependence on these organisations and 
their debt management prescriptions.  
 
The next chapter further critiques the country‘s HIPC Initiative successes on a number of 
levels and also emphasises some of the social welfare and political factors as well as the 
debt sustainability that the country is still grappling with, which have not been 















Chapter 4: The HIPC in Uganda - Success or Failure Debate 
 
The literature concerning the assessment of the outcomes of the HIPC Initiative in 
Uganda can be divided into two broad categories – there is the optimistic view and the 
pessimistic view. On the one hand, scholars such as Harpa Elin Haraldsdottir (2006), 
Kuteesa and Nabbumba (2004), Mijumbi (2001), Mackinnon and Reinikka (2000) and 
Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa (1999) take a more optimistic view of the outcome of the 
HIPC Initiative in the country. Although their work does make mentio  of some of the 
shortcomings of the HIPC Initiative and the Ugandan policies that accompanied it, 
generally they choose to focus on the major gains that were made under the Initiative and 
support the view that the HIPC Initiative has brought more good than harm to Uganda. 
For instance, often the optimistic view has the underlying claim that had Uganda not 
taken part in the HIPC Initiative, the country would be even more indebted and unable to 
provide basic social welfare resources for the public. Furthermore, these scholars tend to 
depict Uganda as the HIPC Initiative‘s ―showcase‖ and they probe whether the results 
seen in Uganda are able to be replicated in other countries in need of an effective debt 
management scheme.  
 
On the other hand, scholars who support a more pessimistic view of Uganda‘s experience 
under the HIPC Initiative, such as Mwaba (2001), Nyamugasira and Rowden (2002), 
Somerville (2005), Mwenda (2006), Easterly (2006) and others, are generally more 
critical of the outcomes of the programme. Although these scholars may criticise 















nor the Initiative are without serious and often fundamental flaws. This section of the 
mini dissertation critiques the arguments brought forward from both sides. The areas of 
critique encompass the disputes around the economic, political and social aspects of 
Uganda‘s performance under the HIPC Initiative. The HIPC Initiative was ideally 
intended to make improvements in all three of these spheres and according to its 
supporters Uganda is an example of this. However, this chapter argues that there are 
many problems with the HIPC Initiative within itself, as well as within Uganda and its 
leadership, which the HIPC Initiative has not managed to overcome. Thus, this study also 
argues that although the improvements made under the HIPC Initiative should be 
acknowledged there is a limited extent to which the HIPC Initiative has been effective.  
  
Furthermore, this mini dissertation argues that although the PRSP aspect of the HIPC 
Initiative supposedly offers Uganda the chance to have more policy ownership and has 
allowed civil society to participate in constructing policies that alleviate poverty in 
addition to alleviating debt, there are still barriers to this. The dissertation argues that 
when it comes to policy ownership the HIPC Initiative created a false expectation that 
this would genuinely happen through the PRSP. Although there are indications that 
NGOs and civil society were dissatisfied with the PRSP process, in a sense one can query 
how NGOs and civil society can expect Uganda or any HIPC to really gain policy 
ownership if, at the end of the day, they owe (and would like to continue to gain access 
to) such large sums of money from major international financial institutions. Moreover, 
what has been lacking in many of the analyses of the topic is that Uganda has been a 















the manner in which economic reforms and poverty-alleviation strategies have been able 
to take place.  
 
One of the key goals of the HIPC Initiative, particularly the Enhanced HIPC Initiative, 
was to bring external debt to a sustainable level so that HIPCs would be able to run their 
economies effectively and also have enough funds to target poverty reduction projects 
that they previously could not afford successfully. Despite Uganda receiving praise from 
HIPC Initiative supporters and the many indications that Uganda has made progress in 
the sphere of social welfare development, poverty and poverty-related issues continue to 
be a major problem in the country. Interestingly, Nannyonjo (2001) and Lindner (2003) 
explain that some social indicators, especially those for education and health, were 
relatively favourable in the 1960s; however, in the 1970s and the 1980s they were poor. 
For instance, Uganda‘s healthcare delivery system was considered one of the best in 
Africa and it was also easily accessible and free of charge at government health facilities, 
which were well attended. However, it deteriorated in the 1970s and for the most part of 
the 1980s (Nannyonjo, 2001: 14). Necessarily, this was also a consequence of the 
political instability and civil war that plagued the country over the decades. Nonetheless, 
once stability was established, additional funding was needed in order to address these 
social development problems and alleviate poverty. Hence, the HIPC Initiative, which 
promised to relieve the country‘s debt burden and poverty levels simultaneously, was 
















However, some argue that the Ugandan government‘s involvement in the provision of 
social services had been fairly extensive since independence. In the 1960s, education and 
primary healthcare were given considerable emphasis; they were seen as instruments that 
would help reduce poverty and diseases, and raise the low levels of education, thereby 
giving a boost to overall economic development (Nannyonjo, 2001: 9). In contrast, 
Uganda became one of the poorest countries in the world owing to the economic and 
social crises of the 1970s and early 1980s which constrained the amount and quality of 
social services (Mijumbi, 2001: 505). Over and above these crises, there was an 
overriding problem of the inability of the central and local governments to provide 
adequate resources for training, regulation and research. Furthermore, financial 
constraints reduced the levels of remuneration in the service sector to intolerable levels 
(Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1999: 106). Thus, there were diminishing incentives for 
civil servants to work effectively in light of these fundamental institutional problems, and 
reviving the public sector was a major task for policy makers. 
 
With the arrival of Museveni as president, the Ugandan government began to embark on 
policies to address the many social issues that it faced and to overcome some of the 
institutional weaknesses in the public sector. Moreover, according to many scholars, 
including Lindner (2003: 55), Mijumbi (2001: 507), and Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa 
(1999: 55), Uganda has a longer history than most HIPCs of incorporating poverty 
reduction with economic reforms. In 1989 Uganda implemented the PAPSCA, which was 
a scheme put in place as a means of protecting poor and vulnerable segments of society 















World Bank also had a large role in assisting with Uganda‘s social development and the 
Bank played an integral role in the formulation of PAPSCA. However, PAPSCA had a 
limited impact on poverty reduction, even with World Bank assistance, and there were 
more efforts needed subsequent to PAPSCA to ensure that social development 
programmes are successful. 
 
Many studies on the HIPC Initiative and Uganda‘s debt also emphasise the social 
consequences of the debt problem and the impacts of the efforts to resolve the economic 
crisis. Very often, economic reforms, such as structural adjustments, and other debt relief 
programmes, such as the HIPC Initiative, are criticised for worsening the social 
conditions of HIPCs. Thus, over the course of the 1990s Uganda made more attempts to 
grapple with its social issues while at the same time making economic reforms. However, 
these efforts often failed owing to financial and resource constraints and thus Uganda 
largely had to sacrifice poverty alleviation plans for economic needs. 
 
Before the institution of the HIPC Initiative and the PRSP, Uganda had already put in 
place a national strategy for poverty eradication called the Poverty Eradication Action 
Plan (PEAP). The function of the PEAP was essentially to guide policy formulation and 
public spending over the medium term. In addition to the PEAP, the government formed 
the Poverty Action Fund (PAF) as a way of protecting funds going specifically to poverty 
eradication programmes from budgetary cuts. The PAF works as a virtual fund within the 
budget that is funded by HIPC savings, ―earmarked‖ donor funds, and government 















Therefore, This meant that the resources saved from HIPC debt relief that were 
purposively channelled to the PAF allowed Uganda to increase the budget for the most 
critical areas such as primary education, primary healthcare, rural roads, safe water and 
sanitation, and agriculture (Kuteesa and Nabbumba, 2004: 51). 
 
As a result, annual expenditures on education increased by 9 per cent, and yearly health 
expenditure growth was recorded at 20 per cent. What's more, there were also substantial 
increases in spending on water, rural roads, gender, HIV/AIDS, justice, law and order, 
and on environmental spending (Kuteesa and Nabbumba, 2004: 51). However, the most 
contentious areas regarding the progress made under the HIPC Initiative and the PRSP 
include: education; health; and HIV/AIDS. 
 
Unlike many other scholars who critique Uganda‘s poverty reduction attempts under the 
HIPC initiatives, Kuteesa and Nabbumba (2004: 52) discuss Uganda‘s poverty reduction 
progress in terms of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The areas that this 
thesis focuses on are education, health and HIV/AIDS, which are some of the most 
contentious issues in the country to be highlighted in the country‘s PRSP. In particular, 
the authors argue that Uganda‘s achievements in the social welfare development sphere 
are simultaneously in line with the fulfilment of the MDGs since there is a substantial 
overlap between the PEAP, PRSP and MDG targets: 
• Education: Uganda‘s Universal Primary Education (UPE) policy, initiated in 1997, 
led to an upsurge in gross primary enrolment from 2.6 million to 7.3 million pupils in 















level was closed through this policy. Somerville (2005: 222) recalls that there were 
increases in education expenditure alone from 1.5 per cent to 2.5 per cent of the 
Ugandan budget from 1996/1997 following the implementation of the UPE. 
However, it is also necessary to mention that pupil retention, the quality of education 
and increased access to post-primary schooling still needed to be improved (Kuteesa 
and Nabbumba, 2004: 52). Therefore, the quality over the quantity argument raised 
earlier is a relevant and common criticism of the PRSP and its accompanying 
policies. Nannyongo (2001: 11) mentions a number of examples that relate to this 
criticism; for instance, although access to education has increased, the ratio of pupils 
per classroom is still far from the targets included in the PRSP. This points out the 
critical dilemma concerning Uganda‘s education system. Necessarily, Nannyongo 
(2001: 11) mentions that there are further concerns related to where to focus the 
meagre resources: whether to provide a cheap or even free basic education to the 
broad masses or to concentrate more on the higher levels of education in order to 
improve capacity in government and the private sector. Thus, although Uganda may 
be able to boast impressive educational expenditure and enrolment figures, there are 
still many issues that the funds from the HIPC Initiative and the PRSP perhaps did 
not foresee.  
• HIV/AIDS: Uganda is often recognised for its proactive approach towards 
HIV/AIDS. Since the launch of the HIPC Initiative the prevalence rates have fallen 
considerably, from 14 per cent in the mid-1990s to 6.5 per cent during 2001 to 2002 
(Kuteesa and Nabbumba, 2004: 53). Generally, Uganda‘s ability to reduce the 















education programme and the country has been one of the most successful nations on 
the African continent in responding to the HIV/AIDS crisis. However, the disease has 
caused an enormous strain on the health sector. Particularly, the healthcare system 
continues to suffer from shortages in staff, medication and preventative primary 
healthcare (AfDB/OECD, 2006: 517). What‘s more, the impact of AIDS itself has 
rapidly extended beyond the healthcare system. For instance, young and well-
educated adults are mainly affected by AIDS, causing the size and quantity of labour 
input to fall, with negative impact on productivity. Also, some farms are being 
abandoned or restricted to subsistence farms owing to the reduced labour supply. 
Children have often either had to leave school at an early age to support families, or 
have become orphans and sometimes have even had to fend for themselves as a result 
of the AIDS deaths in families (Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1999: 126). 
• Roads: The share of the rural road network being maintained regularly has 
increased, from 20 per cent in 1997-98 to 60 per cent in 2000 (Kuteesa and 
Nabbumba, 2004: 53). 
• Water and Sanitation: Access to water has improved nationally, from 40 per cent in 
1997 to 52 per cent in 2001. Sanitation, however, remains a problematic area 
(Kuteesa and Nabbumba, 2004: 53). 
• Health: Improving the health status of the Ugandan population remains a major 
challenge. There is still too little progress in reducing infant, child and maternal 
mortality rates and increasing immunisation rates (Kuteesa and Nabbumba, 2004: 53). 
As with the education dilemma, while the government has emphasised the importance 















while the majority of the population actually lives in the rural areas (Nyamugasira 
and Rowden, 2002: 34). 
 
Despite some of the important progress made in terms of the MDGs, Mwaba (2001: 21) 
argues that Uganda is still ranked lower than any of its neighbours on the UN HDI. More 
generally, Haraldsdottir (2006: 59) and Okidi, Ssewanyana, Bategeka, Muhumuza (2004) 
also raise the quantity over quality critique of the HIPC Initiative on the grounds that 
there is strong evidence to show that the service quality of education and health has been 
sacrificed for an increase in quantity. Necessarily, this has resulted in the non-availability 
of drugs, absence of qualified health staff, lack of preventive primary healthcare, and 
prevalence of poor sanitation diseases and HIV/AIDS (DAC, 2005; Haraldsdottir, 2006: 
59). Thus, the quality of key public services remains a challenge for Uganda despite the 
perceived gains of the HIPC Initiative (Haraldsdottir, 2006: 59).  
 
Moreover, the problem of low quality public services is that they can dramatically reduce 
the effectiveness of public spending, and, as a result, necessarily fail to improve the 
living standards of the poor and increase their human capital (Haraldsdottir, 2006: 59). In 
addition to this, Haraldsdottir (2006: 59) argues that the consequence of this poor service 
is that people who can afford to pay for education and health services prefer private or 
NGO-run facilities over public ones. Therefore, although the supporters of the HIPC 
Initiative may mention the important impact that debt relief and the PRSP has had on 















into account these new issues that the country has to face regarding the quality of new 
available services.  
 
Haraldsdottir (2006: 60) highlights that another important reason for the decline in 
poverty reduction is that agriculture, which provide income for the bulk of the 
population, has grown slowly (at a rate much lower than the overall growth rate of the 
economy). She points out that after the economic boom in the mid-1990s, the main 
agricultural tradable, coffee, suffered significant price falls, prompting systematic efforts 
to increase the export shares of other commodities such as fish and flowers 
(Haraldsdottir, 2006: 60-61). Therefore, she argues, although the effort has paid off, the 
remaining problem is that the poverty effects are limited given that they engage only a 
small segment of the population, unlike the coffee sector. Furthermore, although the 
proportion of donor assistance going into the general budget support is increasing, the 
share of agriculture in the total budget has been, and is projected to be, below 4 per cent 
(Haraldsdottir, 2006: 61).  
 
With this said, there have been notable changes to the state of poverty and social 
development since the launch of the HIPC Initiative which should be acknowledged. 
Furthermore, it could be argued that surely Uganda‘s problems will take years to 
overcome. Therefore, the achievements that have been made should be seen in light of 
the fact that effective change is a long process. Thus, in a sense, initiatives that have been 
implemented to assist the HIPC Initiative, such as the PEAP/PRSP, the PAF and the UPE, 















necessary to note how and where the government has made mistakes and poverty 
reduction has failed under the HIPC Initiative. For example, less investment has gone to 
the productive sectors, particularly agriculture, from which the majority of the poor 
derive their livelihood, and hence there is an observed rise in poverty (Kuteesa and 
Nabbumba, 2004: 53). Furthermore, inequalities between socioeconomic groups and 
regions persist (Kuteesa and Nabbumba, 2004: 53). In addition, it is often argued that the 
provision of social services in Uganda is plagued by an urban bias, with services 
concentrated in the confines of the major urban centres; and by a shortage of both 
resources and personnel to modernise and adapt the institutions to the needs of the 
expanding population (Nyamugasira and Rowden, 2002: 34). Thus, there are numerous 
issues that have arisen as a result of the poverty reduction efforts, which policy makers 
may not have predicted beforehand. 
 
To further illustrate the rural urban economic disparity, the AfDB and OECD 
documented that, between 1999 and 2003, the absolute number of poor people increased 
more in rural areas than in urban areas (AfDB/OECD, 2006: 517). Moreover, they noted 
that the rise in poverty has been particularly marked in households where agriculture is 
the main occupation, with crop farmers worse off than those involved in other 
agricultural activities. In addition to this, Uganda‘s income inequality increased by 23 per 
cent between 1997 and 2003, with urban areas experiencing higher income inequality 
growth – of - 37.5 per cent – than rural areas, where income inequality increased by only 
9.5 per cent during the same period (AfDB/OECD, 2006: 517). Since these years 















poverty the government was also faced with a growing income gap between rich and the 
poor. This has implications for the success of the initiative and the country‘s own ability 
to build its human capital effectively.  
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, there are numerous scholars that 
favourably view the HIPC Initiative in Uganda and prefer to highlight the positive 
aspects of the debt management programme. Kuteesa and Nabbumba (2004: 49) describe 
Uganda‘s experience with the HIPC Initiative as being broadly positive. Their most 
obvious justification for this is the fact that Uganda was the first country to qualify for 
debt relief under both the first HIPC and the Enhanced HIPC Initiative in April 1998 and 
April 2000, respectively, and this naturally indicates the country‘s determination to 
succeed under the programme (Kuteesa and Nabbumba, 2004: 49). Furthermore, the 
speed with which Uganda qualified for debt relief was significant. HIPCs typically have 
to engage in a standard six-year qualifying period, but Uganda qualified within months 
and this was a reflection of the country‘s exemplary record of macroeconomic reform and 
a proven commitment to poverty reduction (Kuteesa and Nabbumba, 2004: 49). With 
these results in mind, Uganda is often viewed as the HIPC Initiative‘s ―showcase‖ or 
―success story‖ by the supporters of the programme, and occasionally scholars also 
attempt to predict whether other HIPCs will be able to replicate Uganda‘s progress. 
 
The combined debt relief given to Uganda under HIPC I and II was supposed to enable 
Uganda to remain on a sustainable debt path for the foreseeable future, as measured by a 















from debt rescheduling (Kuteesa and Nabbumba, 2004: 53). However, results of two debt 
sustainability analyses (DSA) conducted in 2002 indicated a rise in Uganda‘s debt-to-
exports ratio over the 18 months since the Enhanced HIPC completion point to almost 
200 per cent (Kuteesa and Nabbumba, 2004: 53-54). Over and above this, calculations 
made by the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development at the end of 
2003 suggested that this ratio had risen, to 307 per cent as at end of June 2003. This is 
also 15 per cent higher than Uganda‘s NPV debt-to-exports level prior to accessing HIPC 
I (Kuteesa and Nabbumba, 2004: 54). Thus, despite receiving the HIPC assistance, 
Uganda‘s debt increased, and in 2004 was declared unsustainable again by the IMF and 
World Bank (Mwenda, 2006: 6).  
 
After such promising initial results from both the original HIPC and Enhanced HIPC 
Initiative, it is concerning that Uganda fell into the debt trap once again. This rise in 
unsustainable debt could have meant that Uganda had clearly not managed to control its 
debt levels after receiving its debt relief, or that the HIPC Initiative itself was deeply 
flawed, its results unreliable and that adequate support systems were not in place for 
avoiding a digressio  into further debt. This begs the question: ‗what caused this 
regression? Is the HIPC Initiative flawed?‘ ‗Were there elements of the international 
political economy that prevented the sustained success of the initiative?‘ ‗What kind of 
















In response to this, optimistic scholars insist that the rapid rise in the unsustainable levels 
of the debt was not a result of poor macroeconomic management, as inflation remained 
low and stable at an average level of 5 per cent at the time, the government was pursuing 
a fiscal strategy of deficit reduction to enhance private sector development and emphasis 
was on efficiency rather than volume of public spending (Kuteesa and Nabbumba, 2004: 
54). The scholars, instead, provide four primary reasons they feel explain the rise in 
Uganda‘s debt-to-exports ratio. First, they argue, the terms of trade deteriorated for 
Uganda‘s major exports owing to the fall in global commodity prices (Kuteesa and 
Nabbumba, 2004: 54). For example, at the Enhanced HIPC decision point, the three-year 
average value of Uganda‘s export earnings for the year ending 2002-2003 was projected 
at US$ 1,007 million. However, the actual value turned out to be US$ 726 million, 
reflecting a fall of 28 per cent (Kuteesa and Nabbumba, 2004: 54). 
 
Secondly, they argue that at the Enhanced HIPC decision point estimates for new 
financing in the macroeconomic framework and balance of payments were not fully 
incorporated in the DSA (Kuteesa and Nabbumba, 2004: 54). Uganda had borrowed US$ 
1 billion since reaching the HIPC completion point, and although these new borrowings, 
which were primarily from the multilateral development institutions, had been on highly 
concessional terms, they led the nominal debt stock to increase from US$ 3.2 billion at 
the time of the Enhanced HIPC to US$ 4.2 billion as at end of June 2003 (Kuteesa and 
















Thirdly, not all creditors were willing to deliver debt relief under the HIPC Initiative, as 
was assumed. In particular, commercial creditors who refused the 1992 debt buyback and 
non-OECD bilateral creditors were unwilling to extend relief, leading to arrears 
accumulation, which contributed to the rise in the debt stock (Kuteesa and Nabbumba, 
2004: 54). In addition to this, Uganda‘s debt sustainability was affected by the fact that 
not all creditors were willing to participate in equal burden-sharing, and some have even 
rejected participation in the HIPC initiative outright (Kuteesa and Nabbumba, 2004: 55).  
 
Interestingly, these scholars also note that a number of creditors have taken Uganda to 
court, suing for the payment of their debts in full, plus compensation, which compounds 
the country‘s debt problem (Kuteesa and Nabbumba, 2004: 55). The authors noted that 
by 2004, there were four cases that have been successful, although one is currently on 
appeal, and Uganda has been forced to pay over US$ 20 million in recompense so far, 
which drained a large amount of the country‘s HIPC relief savings (Kuteesa and 
Nabbumba, 2004: 55). Lastly, low global interest rates have increased the present value 
of Uganda‘s debt and reduced the concessionality of IDA lending terms (Kuteesa and 
Nabbumba, 2004: 55).  
 
UNCTAD (2004a: 43) has also noted problems with the concept of debt sustainability, 
which is a forward-looking approach and takes into account many variables that cannot 
be predicted with much certainty. This is precisely how, for example, a country that was 
judged to have sustainable debt could subsequently be ravished by famine and thus fall 















control is not realistically possible and is subject to shocks. Uganda was deemed to have 
reached a sustainable debt level under both HIPC initiatives, even after qualifying and 
receiving assistance, but shortly after its debt became unsustainable again. Debt relief can 
be seen as temporary since the country that receives it often has its savings spread out 
over a number of years and must continue to borrow; however, in addition to this its debt 
will continue to increase again (Mutume, 2001: 26). Therefore, Uganda and many HIPCs 
that qualify and receive assistance expose a critical problem with the concept of debt 
sustainability. They indicate that the concept fails to include new debt which these 
countries and continues to incur in order to pay charges on their remaining old debts and 
run their economies. Thus, Uganda and many other countries continue to face 
unsustainable levels of debt even after receiving HIPC relief (Mutume, 2001: 26). 
 
In response to this critique on debt sustainability, the IMF admits that the HIPCs‘ 
medium- and long-term debt sustainability are still not assured since these countries 
remain vulnerable to shocks, particularly those affecting exports and their payment 
capacity, which is highly sensitive to the terms of new financing (Vallée and Vallée, 
2005: 190). However, optimistically, they see this as an opportunity for countries to 
reduce their debt vulnerabilities independently and decisively. Particularly, the MFIs 
believe that the HIPCs need to source additional aid flows, pursue cautious borrowing 
policies and strengthen their public debt management capacities (Vallée and Vallée, 
2005: 190). With these ideas in mind, the HIPC Initiative notion of debt sustainability 
implied that any further economic complications, before or after sustainability had been 















ill-equipped to handle the limits to the MFIs‘ debt sustainability and the medium- to long-
term possibilities. Therefore, it can be argued that additional resources should be made 
available to countries that make genuine attempts at overcoming the challenges of 
sustaining lower debt.  
 
Whether it is up to the HIPC Initiative or the HIPCs themselves to deal with their 
digressing into debt unsustainability is also being debated among scholars. Perhaps the 
country is learning from its past mistakes under the Initiative, and is essentially being 
proactive about managing its debt levels again. For example, Uganda has adopted a three-
pronged strategy for maintaining debt sustainability in the future: ensuring all new 
borrowings continue to be highly concessional; reducing the country‘s fiscal deficit in the 
medium term; and implementing growth-enhancing policy reforms that expand and 
diversify export production, thus minimising shocks to the economy (Kuteesa and 
Nabbumba, 2004: 55). 
 
Necessarily, Kuteesa and Nabbumba (2004: 53) note that both the Medium-Term and 
Long-Term Expenditure frameworks are being re-orientated to address these new 
challenges so as to enhance the poverty focus of public spending. The government is 
committed to increase the share of the budget spent on PAF, which rose from 18 per cent 
in 1997-1998 to 35 per cent in 2001-2002 (Kuteesa and Nabbumba, 2004: 53). 
 
Nevertheless, scholars argue that the international community needs to do more to help 















of reasons for this (Kuteesa and Nabbumba, 2004: 55). Firstly, Uganda has been unduly 
penalised by virtue of the fact that it was the first country to access the HIPC debt relief 
initiative (Kuteesa and Nabbumba, 2004: 55). They declare that Uganda has been 
penalised in the sense that errors made in the calculation of HIPC debt relief to Uganda 
have been corrected for subsequent countries (Kuteesa and Nabbumba, 2004: 55). 
Moreover, subsequent countries accessing the Initiative have had their exports valued at 
the prevailing lower global commodity prices, which means they have been given 
relatively more relief to enable them to arrive at the same present value debt-to-exports 
ratio. Therefore, there is a strong case for additional relief to be extended to Uganda to 
rectify these inequalities and to help improve its debt sustainability indicators (Kuteesa 
and Nabbumba, 2004: 55). 
 
Secondly, since Uganda has not received all the relief it expected, as a result of the non-
participation of a number of creditors, further international debt relief would also help to 
ease the financial impact on Uganda of this unforeseen non-participation (Kuteesa and 
Nabbumba, 2004: 55). This problem is not unique to Uganda, and is a clear indication of 
how the HIPC Initiative, and particularly donors, have disappointed the HIPCs. Although 
the largest creditors (the World Bank, the AfDB, the IMF, the Inter-American 
Development Bank, and all Paris Club creditors) provide debt relief in line with their 
commitments under the HIPC Initiative, others are lagging behind. Smaller multilateral 
institutions, non-Paris Club official bilateral creditors, and commercial creditors, which 
together account for about 25 per cent of total HIPC Initiative costs, have delivered only 















Club bilateral creditors as a whole have delivered approximately 40 per cent of their 
share of HIPC Initiative debt relief. However, close to half of these creditors have not 
delivered any relief at all. The delivery of HIPC Initiative relief by commercial creditors, 
although still low at an estimated 33 per cent, has increased markedly in recent years 
through a few large operations. A number of commercial creditors have initiated 
litigations against HIPCs, raising significant legal challenges to burden sharing in the 
context of the Initiative (Gilman and Mitchell, 2004: 88).  
 
Furthermore, given the voluntary nature of creditor participation in the HIPC Initiative, 
the IMF and the World Bank have only been able to use moral suasion to encourage 
creditors to participate in the Initiative, and to deliver fully their share of HIPC Initiative 
debt relief and to consult with both debtors and creditors (Gilman and Mitchell, 2004: 
88). However, it is obvious moral suasion is not sufficient and that more should be done 
by the MFIs to put additional authoritative pressure on other creditors, who are reluctant 
to participate fairly in the HIPC Initiative. 
 
Finally, optimists often suggest that the international community can help reduce 
Uganda‘s future debt burden by giving more aid in the form of grants, rather than loans, 
thus reducing Uganda‘s future borrowings from multilateral development institutions 
(Kuteesa and Nabbumba, 2004: 55). However, since the international community in 
many respects has failed Uganda and many of the HIPCs one might be justified in 
querying whether this optimistic suggestion is sufficient and reliable. Moreover, 















dependence. Therefore, one could ask: what should Ugandan leadership do to reduce its 
apparent dependence on the international community? 
 
By contrast, Mwenda (2006: 6), a more pessimistic scholar, argues that debt relief served 
as a licence for the Ugandan government to borrow even more. He illustrates how, in the 
six years before the HIPC Initiative, foreign aid to Uganda averaged US$ 593 million per 
year, whereas in the six years after HIPC, it averaged US$ 783 million per year. This 
indicated an increase in foreign aid inflows of 32 per cent (Mwenda, 2006: 6). 
Furthermore, although there has been a movement by donors away from loans and 
towards grants, there is still a significant amount of foreign aid that comes from the 
multilateral donors, such as the IMF and World Bank, in the form of highly 
concessionary loans (Mwenda, 2006: 6). In the five years following the HIPC debt relief 
of US$ 2 billion, the debt rose to US$ 4.9 billion (Mwenda, 2006: 6).  
 
Mwenda (2006: 6) claims that government corruption and the government‘s misuse of 
funds were key reasons for the re-emergence of debt unsustainability in Uganda. He 
states that immediately after Uganda‘s debts were forgiven under the HIPC Initiative, the 
government indulged the political elite and the military (Mwenda, 2006: 5). The country 
incurred expenses such as a new private jet for the president, which cost US$ 35 million; 
military exploits in neighbouring Sudan and Congo, which increased military spending 
from US$ 110 million in 2000 to US$ 200 million in 2005; increased military corruption, 
particularly during times of civil unrest in the northern part of Uganda; and political 















according to the Ministry of Finance Public Expenditure Review of 2002 (Mwenda, 
2006: 5-6).  
 
William Easterly (2006: 200) is another scholar who highlights the problematic levels of 
corruption and how corruption, is an immense contributor to the debt problem. Easterly 
believes that ―in reality there are few clear-cut political breaks with a corrupt past‖ 
(Easterly, 2006: 200). By this he implies that the political factors that make governments 
corrupt often persist over time, and questions how ‗clean‘ the new government must be to 
represent a complete departure from the mismanagement of the previous regime 
(Easterly, 2006: 200). In considering the case of Uganda, he compares the Amin 
administration to the leadership of the Museveni regime. He argues that the Museveni 
government, like Amin, continued to spend money on questionable military adventures in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (Easterly, 2006: 200).  
 
Thus, Mwenda (2006: 6) believes that the argument put forward that more debt relief is 
needed in Uganda is weak, because even though Uganda may have one of the best policy 
environments in sub-Saharan Africa it still faces key challenges in its political leadership. 
These issues hamper the country‘s ability to sustain its economic successes and channel 
resources to the poor. He continues that there is no evidence of a positive relationship 
between increasing aid and debt forgiveness on the one hand and poverty reduction on 















1992 and 1999. However, since the debt relief in 1998 and the increase in foreign aid, 
poverty has begun to increase again (Mwenda, 2006: 6). 
 
Furthermore, there is also debate about whether the claim is valid that Uganda has 
managed to develop and implement debt management and poverty alleviation policies 
through consultative and inclusive means. According to the leading NGO in the country, 
the Ugandan Debt Network (UDN), the following local and international NGOs, CSOs 
(Civil Society Organisations) and research institutions were part of the PRSP discussion 
process: Oxfam (UK); Action Aid (UK); VECO Uganda (Belgium); SNV (Netherlands); 
MS Uganda (Denmark); Action For Development in Uganda (ACFODE); the Uganda 
Women's Network (UWONET); the Centre for Basic Research and Makerere Institute of 
Social Research (MISR); the Uganda chapter of the Forum for Women Educationalists 
(FAWE); World Vision International and the Catholic Medical Bureau (Gariyo, 2002: 
25). From this it seems that the NGO and CSO community that participated in the 
consultations regarding the PRSP covered a broad spectrum of concerns that needed to be 
considered in the debate and policy making process. Hence, Uganda is often praised for 
its successful inclusion of the NGO and CSO community when the country was 
formulating its debt management and poverty-reduction strategy. 
 
Nevertheless, despite the presence of these NGOs and CSOs, Somerville (2005: 220) still 
notes that there was actually much controversy regarding the economic policies 
developed to accelerate growth and the level of public consultation. Necessarily, 















development of the poverty-reduction goals, but the specific nature of the policies to 
achieve the goals of the PRSP were not negotiable (Somerville, 2005: 220). As a result, 
the NGOs and CSOs felt that there was a distinct neo-liberal policy framework, similar to 
the structural adjustment policies, which had been dictated by donors and the government 
but which they did not agree with (Somerville, 2005: 220).  
 
In light of the above, Somerville (2005: 220) argues that firstly, it is evident that there is a 
clear divergence of opinion between the NGO/CSO and creditor community concerning 
the HIPC Initiative, which has not been appreciated. Secondly, he argues that there is also 
a resource dependency relationship whereby donors can leverage their policies into 
enforcement. Finally, in light of the previous points, he believes that the legitimacy of the 
policy framework and the integrity of the World Bank and IMF are suspicious.  
 
According to the Ugandan Debt Network (UDN), CSOs indeed felt left out of the later 
stages of the policy making process, when they were excluded from the discussions that 
turned the Uganda PEAP into the PRSP (that was presented to the IMF/World Bank 
Executive Boards) (Gariyo, 2002: 25). The UDN report makes the following further 
claims about the PRSP process: 
 
Although, there were numerous contacts with government officials at all stages in the 
preparation of the PEAP, there were fewer contacts with donors and more specifically the 
IMF and the World Bank missions in the preparation of the IMF version of the PRSP 
document. The few meetings that took place between the missions and CSOs were almost 
like verification meetings to find out the level of civil society participation and the quality 
of inputs. Members of the Task Force met with various World Bank missions and a 
mission from the US State Department, but these discussions were more general. 
















Thus, the claims made by Somerville (2005) and the UDN (2002) are critical of the depth 
and relevance of the PRSP process and whether there was an authentic improvement in 
policy making around debt, since the top-down approach of previous programmes like 
the structural adjustments of the 1980s and the original HIPC Initiative. Although, the 
inclusion of the CSOs and NGOs is a progressive step towards considering, mobilising 
and organising the grassroots movements around the debt problem and its numerous 
impacts, it is argued that there seems to be a limit to which the government and the 
international financial institutions are willing to engage with social movements and 
alternative thinkers. 
 
However, in contrast, some scholars hold a more optimistic view concerning the extent of 
the involvement of NGOs and CSOs. Particularly, since the Enhanced HIPC Initiative 
insists that one of the central features of the PRSP is civil society participation, Uganda is 
often viewed as having achieved this and as being very active in engaging in dialogue 
with the various groups (Haraldsdottir, 2006: 64). According to Haraldsdottir (2006: 64-
65) this is because the formulation of Uganda‘s PRSP seemed to match with the desire of 
the government to revise the PEAP and convert it into the country‘s PRSP. Furthermore, 
the PEAP was first developed in 1997 following an 18-month-long consultation 
involving stakeholders that included central and local governments, NGOs, (CSOs), 
donors, and academia (Mackinnon and Reinikka, 2000: 47). Thus, Uganda represents a 
positive example of the PEAP and PRSP process and planning being influenced by 
















To more optimistic scholars, including Haraldsdottir (2006) and Mackinnon and Reinikka 
(2000), they argue that Uganda‘s experience of civil society participation in the 
preparation of its PRSP demonstrates the ability and need for CSOs to influence policies 
effectively. With this said, these scholars believe that there should also be a conducive 
policy environment and a government commitment to these robust dialogues and 
criticisms. In particular, Uganda presents an impressive model because despite the fact 
that there are strict guidelines for civil society participation in the PRSP process, most 
governments in Africa are still sceptical about engaging CSOs in policy planning at this 
level (Haraldsdottir, 2006: 65). They argue that the Government of Uganda did well to 
ensure that CSOs were given enough space in the PEAP/PRSP process by organising 
independent consultations and incorporating as much of their input into the documents as 
possible. Furthermore, these organisations were given a platform from which to critique 
public spending and hold government accountable (Mackinnon and Reinikka, 2000: 51). 
Hence, civil society organisations have, since 1999, earned themselves an open space to 
participate regularly in the Consultative Group (CG) meetings that are held annually in 
the country.  
 
However, one might expect that there would be concerns that the creditors and the NGOs 
and CSOs would differ in noteworthy ways, especially since creditors are more prone to 
follow a neo-liberal paradigm, whereas NGOs and CSOs tend to be more radical. In 
reality this must have caused some tension when Uganda was negotiating policies with 
these competing groups. This thesis argues that it seems that in the process of trying to 















Initiative has made Uganda accountable to many institutions, and because of this the 
country has a limited scope of policy ownership. Secondly, this paper argues that it is 
likely that there may have been clashes of interest and that the Ugandan leadership would 
ultimately favour a policy that impresses their international creditors, whom they are in 
fact more dependent on, rather than one that favours their NGOs and CSOs. Thus, in this 
aspect, the principles of the HIPC Initiative are not necessarily far from previous debt 
management policies that have been dictated with a top-down approach, which is 
characteristic of MFI policies towards poor developing countries. 
 
Furthermore, Easterley (2006) believes that the fiscal discipline required and the complex 
policy advice suggested by the HIPC Initiative and the MFIs would be difficult for even 
the most skilled policy makers in advanced economies to meet. Therefore, a government 
in a poor country, suffering from a scarcity of qualified managers, is not likely to succeed 
at achieving the unrealistic goals of the initiative (Easterley, 2006: 202). 
 
Nonetheless, some optimists believe that the HIPC Initiative is an important step in the 
right direction to foster sustainable growth in low-income countries, and to integrate debt 
relief into a global poverty-reduction strategy. However, it is also vital to emphasise that 
as Uganda and the HIPCs face unmanageable debt and deep structural processes, the 
Initiative is not a panacea for broader economic development problems and scholars 
should not make the mistake of overcharging the Initiative with exaggerated expectations 















needs to be understood more holistically as only a step in the process of improving the 
country‘s economy and alleviating debt and debt effects on poor countries. On this 
optimistic note, although Uganda was not able to eliminate its debt and poverty, there 
were many lessons learnt under the HIPC Initiative and it can also be questioned whether 
some of the improvements, including the short lived improvements, achieved by the 
country would have happened without the HIPC Initiative. 
 
However, although the optimists may be correct in arguing that the HIPC Initiative 
should not be seen as a panacea for the debt problem, as there are many unpredictable 
events that could alter the outcomes, the HIPC Initiative should also not be the cause of 
debt being compounded. This is a clear indication that the policy is a failure. 
Furthermore, perhaps the Initiative should have defined its objectives more carefully in 
order to discourage unrealistic expectations of it.   
 
Concerning policy ownership, Haraldsdottir (2006) holds a similar view to Somerville 
(2005) and admits that:  
Commitment to reforms does not, however, necessarily mean ownership of reforms. The 
Ugandan government did not fully design its liberalisation strategy but largely followed 
donor, especially World Bank, advice and conditionality. Interest in stronger government 
ownership of the reform programme was, however, manifested in a number of areas. The 
president displayed active commitment to various reform initiatives. Decisions to embark 
on more challenging structural reforms were often initiated in the absence of donor 
support or conditionality but attracted financial assistance once commitment was evident 
in the preparatory and design work. (Haraldsdottir, 2006: 63-64) 
 
Thus, the desire for more reform ownership in Uganda, and the claims that policy 
ownership is increasing in the more recent debt management schemes such as the HIPC 















is debatable how much ownership over these policies Uganda can expect to claim if, 
ultimately, the country needs to choose policies that will lead to favourable relations with 
its creditors and/or its NGOs and CSOs. Furthermore, even if reform ownership is 
possible, how would it be implemented?  
 
A further point concerning policy making, is that a significant amount of the literature on 
Uganda‘s HIPC Initiative performance does not give an account of the impact of 
Uganda‘s single-party state, and its impact on debt management and policy making. The 
fact that President Museveni had been in power for over 20 years must have made an 
impact, good and/or bad, on his ability to pioneer policy decisions. However, this remains 
a relatively unacknowledged area of discussion in the literature on Uganda‘s experience 
of the HIPC Initiative, in particular, and debt management in general. Thus, there remains 
the question of whether Uganda‘s successes or failures under the HIPC Initiative can be 
attributed to its single-party state. Furthermore, do some scholars prefer not to make a 
linkage between the absence of democracy in a poor country and its ability to pursue 
economic reforms? 
 
In sum, this chapter has discussed some of the strengths and weaknesses of the HIPC 
Initiative through surveying the literature on Uganda‘s experience of the programme. 
Although Uganda‘s debt levels have not managed to improve over a sustained period to 
prove that the HIPC Initiative can work and has worked for the country, there have still 
been a number of important improvements in its social welfare development. The fact 
that NGOs and CSOs feel somewhat constrained could be an indication that Uganda has 















said, it has been argued that it is also clear to see why Ugandan leadership would aim to 
appease creditors, over NGOs and CSOs, as the country has become increasingly aid 
dependent. However, the claims that Uganda can make about having increased policy 
ownership, even under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative, are still limited. Nevertheless, in 
the process of attempting to strike a balance between economic reforms and public policy 
reform there have also been some notable setbacks, in both the country‘s economy and 
social development and these have been due to a number of different factors. Although 
the optimists still claim that the HIPC Initiative was a step in the right direction, it is 
difficult to see how this was so.  
 
Firstly, Uganda‘s sustainable debt levels were short lived, and, although this is due to 
both internal factors and external factors, it exposed that the HIPC Initiative did not have 
or aim to develop effective support structures to avoid this. Secondly, with Uganda‘s debt 
levels rapidly on the rise, the country would have had to make sacrifices on its spending 
on public services, which is counter to what the HIPC Initiative intended to create. 
Thirdly, although some public services managed to expand because of the Initiative, these 
services did not necessarily reach Ugandans in the rural areas and, furthermore, these 
services did not necessarily offer good quality in order to be effective and make a 
difference regarding poverty alleviation. Thus, this study argues that the HIPC was in fact 
a failure in Uganda, as the success experienced in Uganda was not sustained enough to 
make effective changes in the country. However, even though the initiative was a 
disappointment, there is still the opportunity for Uganda and the HIPCs to view the 















management could improve. The next chapter concludes this mini dissertation and offers 
















Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
This dissertation has assessed the Ugandan experience with the HIPC Initiative, and 
surveyed the literature that has argued for and against the success of the Initiative. This 
study has demonstrated that, in sum, the HIPC Initiative has failed, on a number of levels, 
to provide Uganda with the debt relief it promised. Scholars who are optimistic about the 
HIPC Initiative could respond to this judgement with the question: ‗would Uganda be 
worse off had the HIPC Initiative not been implemented?‘ However, this thesis argues 
that this question has little relevance, as it is evident that the Initiative did not relieve 
Uganda of its debt burden, which is what the programme intended to do. Furthermore, 
even the positive gains that Uganda made under the rogramme were short lived, and 
actually resulted in even more problems in the country, which included compounding 
Kampala‘s debt crisis. Therefore, although the optimistic scholars offer insights 
concerning the amount of relief the country received, Uganda‘s conscious efforts towards 
social welfare development, and the economic growth that occurred under the 
programme, the pessimists also reveal the depth of the fundamental flaws of the HIPC 
initiatives. 
 
Since the Enhanced HIPC Initiative there have been attempts by Uganda and the MFIs to 
improve the initiative further, and to address some of the issues that emerged as a result 
of the programme. There have even been subsequent debt relief programmes such as the 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative, which have aimed to reduce the debt burden of 















reduction. However, external debt in poor countries will remain an ongoing challenge for 
both MFIs and HIPCs to grapple with. Furthermore, it can be argued that some aspects of 
debt relief should not be expected to change in the years to come. And perhaps this is one 
of the key lessons that the HIPC initiatives have taught many poor countries, and many 
critical scholars. 
 
For example, the dependence of Uganda and countries in a similar situation on the donor 
community will continue to occur because these countries are not given sufficient 
flexibility to manage their own policies and simply do not have the funds to act 
independently of the donor community. Therefore, countries like Uganda will develop 
their policies around the opinions of the donor community in order to continue positive 
relations with the donor institutions. This is more relevant given they view Uganda 
favourably as the success story of most donor initiatives. Furthermore, these institutions 
continue to insist on neo-liberal policies that are intended to encourage countries to grow 
their way out of debt, but inevitably end up compounding their debt problem. 
 
Also, although the Enhanced HIPC Initiative has insisted on allowing more opportunities 
for more representation of other stakeholders such as NGOs and CSOs, this could also 
result in leadership having less policy ownership. Hence, while allowing NGOs and 
CSOs to participate in Uganda‘s debt relief process improved the credibility of the 
programme and the accountability of the government, and contributed a more radical 
presence within the debates concerning the Initiative. It also introduced another 















undermine the authority of the government‘s decision making, possibly as much as the 
donor community. Furthermore, having these two opposing forces (the international 
financial institutions and the CSOs) would cause an added strain on policy making within 
government.  
 
Moreover, in light of the inclusion of additional stakeholders in the debt relief system, it 
is still evident that the donor community has the overriding influence over the policies 
that countries develop and implement. This, in turn, undermines the presence of the 
NGOs and CSOs. Therefore, the ability of these groups to play a more meaningful role in 
the process will continue to be limited as the interests of the donor community are often 
given more priority by the HIPC governments, than the interests of the NGOs and CSOs. 
Thus, the premise that the Enhanced HIPC Initiative has improved by including the 
presence of civil society is not a realistic one. 
 
Finally, the more than 20-year relationship that Museveni has had with the donor 
community has yet to be sufficiently explored in the literature on Uganda‘s debt. The fact 
that Museveni regime‘s has been in power for over two decades possibly means that it 
has been easier to create a sense of policy continuity, which in turn has allowed Uganda 
to build special relations with the donor community, unlike other countries. This is a 
relevant area of discussion, as Uganda is often praised for its consistency and 
commitment to economic reform policies. However, this must surely also be a result of 
the fact that the country has had the same president ever since the debt problem first 















makers have gained over the years under various initiatives implies that they would have 
acquired extensive insight into the needs of the Ugandan economy and people. Thus, it is 
alarming that the literature does not draw enough attention to the relationship between the 
length of President Museveni‘s regime and the successes or failures of Uganda‘s debt 
management over the years.  
 
Thus, the HIPC Initiative and similar debt management schemes have fundamental 
problems that will continue to persist. A further problem with these schemes is that they 
have a generic approach to reforms, when each country is unique and will inevitably 
grow at its own pace. Thus, celebrating Uganda as the ―showcase‖ or ―success story‖ of 
the HIPC Initiative and questioning whether the outcomes of Uganda are able to be 
replicated in other countries, can create problematic comparisons as each country needs 
to have its own experience and successes of the HIPC Initiative. Finally, Uganda‘s 
consistent and close relationship with the donor community could provide another reason 
for why it is argued to be a succe s story, despite the numerous problems that the country 
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